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BUSINESS── ARTICLE 043── ── 25 MIN READ

¥68 billion paid, and the new system still isn't running: a report card on rebuilding Japan's "retirement fund" for small business owners

A public agency in Japan is rebuilding the system behind two mutual-aid schemes used by 2.4 million small business owners. According to the Board of Audit, the contracts grew from ¥55.5 billion to ¥96.3 billion, ¥67.9 billion has already been paid, and launch has slipped from August 2025 to February 2028. We read the audit, the agency's own papers, its accounts and its procurement records to find out why it went wrong, what it means for members' payouts, and how it compares with Japan's other big government IT projects.

In an old machine room, DATA TIMES editor-in-chief Kaito Ogasawara frowns with doubt and holds up a thick ring binder whose open pages are blank. Behind him are reel-to-reel tape drives and stacks of yellowed fan-fold printouts. Huge white letters on the left read NEVER WRITTEN DOWN, and a gold line reads The ¥96.3B pitfall

"Why would a system that manages small business owners' retirement savings cost close to ¥100 billion?"

That was the first thing DATA TIMES editor-in-chief Kaito Ogasawara asked when he read Japan's Board of Audit findings in October 2026.

The scheme in question is Japan's Small Business Mutual Aid program. Sole proprietors and directors of small companies pay in every month and get the money back when they close the business or retire. People call it the "retirement fund" for business owners, and more than 40% of new members are freelancers. According to the Board of Audit, the contracts to rebuild the system behind it grew from ¥55.5 billion to ¥96.3 billion (about $640 million at ¥150 to the dollar), and ¥67.9 billion had been paid by the end of March 2026. The new system is not running yet.

Read the audit closely, and one of the stumbles comes down to a single rule: when does a change in the monthly payment take effect?

Members can raise or lower their monthly payment. By law, the new amount applies from the month the application form is received. The new system's design documents, however, applied it from the month the agency approved the change.

Nobody caught the difference until March 2024, after the design had passed review and much of the code had been written. A query from one of the agency's own departments brought it to light. The fix touched a wide range of programs and added ¥3.29 billion to the bill, ¥1.33 billion of it to rewrite code that was already finished.

Chart 3 from the Board of Audit report, in Japanese. Two Gantt charts compare the application development schedule: the original plan (basic design, detailed design, build and unit test, integration test, system test, acceptance test and release preparation in sequence, from April 2022 to release in August 2025) and the schedule as of March 2026 (the same phases stretched out and overlapping, with release moved to February 2027)
The Board of Audit's comparison of the development schedule: the original plan on top, the situation at the end of March 2026 below. Phases that were meant to run one after another have stretched out and now overlap. The release shown here is February 2027; a third delay to February 2028 came later. The chart is in Japanese. (Board of Audit, demand for corrective action (October 21, 2026), p. 11)

A rule that should have been written down wasn't. The same pattern shows up in the data migration, in security and in the loan scheme.

Why do government IT systems end up so expensive and so late? We did not set out to blame one agency. We read the audit and the agency's own papers as a case study in a problem any organization can hit when it rebuilds an old system. Below: how the money and the schedule grew, what caused it, what it means for members' payouts, and how it compares with the Board of Audit's government-wide surveys and with earlier projects.

WHAT IS

The Mutual Aid System Rebuild Project共済システム再構築プロジェクト

SMRJ's plan to rebuild, from scratch, the system that handles about 2.4 million members of two mutual-aid schemes

  1. 2018.04Rebuild beginsSMRJ set up a reform office and began overhauling a paper-and-counter process and the system behind it
  2. 2022.04Design and build startDevelopment contracts were signed on the basis of the requirements, aiming for launch in August 2025
  3. 2024.08First delayMigrating the existing data proved slower than expected, and launch moved to September 2026
  4. NOWLaunch now Feb 2028In October 2026 SMRJ judged it could not secure enough quality and delayed launch a third time

The project belongs to the Organization for Small & Medium Enterprises and Regional Innovation, Japan (SMRJ), a government-affiliated agency. The current system was built in 1975 and patched every time the rules changed, but its last major overhaul was in 1995. It runs on a mainframe whose maintenance ends in fiscal 2035. Members can already apply online, but SMRJ prints that data on paper and keys it back into the old system. The new system is meant to complete procedures online and let members check their total contributions on a personal page.

It serves two schemes. The Small Business Mutual Aid program has 1.723 million members. The Business Safety Mutual Aid program, which lends money to a business whose trading partner goes bankrupt, has 672,000. SMRJ says the system handles about 770,000 transactions a year.

Members of the retirement scheme pay ¥1,000 to ¥70,000 a month, and every yen is tax-deductible. Among new members, the share of independent freelancers with no employees has risen from 26% to 44% in ten years, a government review found. For people who take on AI and data work on their own, this is a familiar scheme.

There are three reasons to look at this now.

First, on October 21, 2026, the Board of Audit demanded corrective action from SMRJ and from the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, the ministry body that oversees it. In the annual audit report sent to the Cabinet on November 5, this one case, at ¥67.9 billion, was the largest of findings totaling ¥144.6 billion. Second, in the same month, SMRJ decided on a third delay. Third, the money comes from the investment returns on members' own contributions.

For those of us who work with AI and data, moving an old system or dataset into something new means writing down everything the old one does, and we know how heavy that job is, even at a much smaller scale. So we checked, one item at a time, what was never written down.

01

A ¥15-30 billion estimate became ¥96.3 billion in contracts

Chapter opener. On a grey steel desk under a lamp, a thin estimate sheet sits on the left and a tower of contract binders rises to the ceiling on the right, with a wall calendar flipping behind. Text reads A ¥15-30B estimate became ¥96.3B

Start with the money. Cost figures for the project have surfaced in public three times.

The first was in November 2018. SMRJ told a government advisory panel (the mutual-aid subcommittee of the Small and Medium Enterprise Policy Council) that the rebuild would cost about ¥15 billion to ¥30 billion. That was a rough estimate based on a quote from the company that built the current system, and it did not include the firms hired to manage the project.

The second was the actual contracts. The 26 contracts signed between 2020 and 2025 added up to ¥55.5 billion at the outset.

The third is the figure the Board of Audit confirmed for the end of March 2026. With extra work piling up and contracts revised again and again, the total reached ¥96.3 billion, about 1.7 times the original. Of that, ¥67.9 billion had already been paid.

Bar chart. 2018 estimate ¥15-30 billion (outline bar), original contracts ¥55.5 billion, contracts as of March 2026 ¥96.3 billion (highlighted). On the left, a large 1.7x versus original contracts, and ¥67.9 billion already paid by the end of March 2026
The 2018 estimate was based on a quote from the company that built the current system and excludes project management and client-support costs. The other two bars are the total of 26 contracts and include operation and maintenance after launch. The three bars do not measure the same thing (DATA TIMES). (DATA TIMES, based on SMRJ committee papers and the Board of Audit report)

The fairest like-for-like comparison is the contract to design and build the new system itself. It was revised eight times and grew from ¥20.68 billion to ¥48.71 billion, about 2.4 times. The "client support" contract, which gives SMRJ's own staff technical backup, went from ¥7.0 billion to ¥14.92 billion.

26 contracts, 20 companies

The project split the work among different companies by role. According to the Board of Audit, the five main contracts were:

  • Overall plan and requirements (2020-2022): Accenture wrote the requirements; PwC Consulting managed progress and supported SMRJ
  • Design and build (2022 onward): IBM Japan designs and builds the new system; EY Strategy and Consulting manages progress and quality; Accenture helps SMRJ staff check the design

Add contracts for infrastructure, a data center, data entry and printing, and the project involved 20 companies and 26 contracts. SMRJ staff and the companies' leads met monthly to review progress and decide what to do next.

Launch has been pushed back three times

The schedule slipped along with the budget.

A timeline with four points: August 2025 (original), September 2026 (first delay), February 2027 (second delay), February 2028 (third delay, highlighted). On the left, a large 2.5 years behind schedule
Planned launch dates for the new system. The first two delays are from the Board of Audit report; the third is from SMRJ's October 2026 announcement (DATA TIMES). (DATA TIMES, based on the Board of Audit report and SMRJ's announcement)

The original launch date was August 2025. In August 2024 it moved to September 2026 so the data migration could be done properly. In September 2025 it moved to February 2027, to fix the payment-change error described above. Those are the two delays the Board of Audit covered.

Then, at a board meeting on October 1, 2026, just before the audit findings came out, SMRJ concluded from the state of development and user acceptance testing that it could not secure enough quality by February 2027. The third delay put launch at February 2028, two and a half years behind the original plan. The extra cost of that delay is not yet in the ¥96.3 billion. SMRJ says it will report the figure later.

When we went through SMRJ's published contract notices, we found the contracts had kept changing after the audit's March 2026 cutoff. In July 2026 the client-support contract rose by ¥2.77 billion; in August the project-management contract rose by ¥298 million, both extended to the end of May 2027. In September the design-and-build contract rose by ¥402 million in its ninth revision. Those three changes alone added about ¥3.5 billion.

02

It went wrong before anyone started building

Chapter opener. In an old machine room, a long ribbon of yellowed fan-fold printout spills from a reel-to-reel tape drive across a table, next to a thick requirements binder open to blank pages and a magnifying glass. Text reads It went wrong before building

The contracts grew by ¥40.7 billion. For ¥36.5 billion of that, the Board of Audit concluded that the increase arose "because the agency's way of running the rebuild project was not appropriate." The rest was additional work the auditors did not attribute to that cause.

Here is how the ¥36.5 billion breaks down by cause.

Horizontal bar chart: causes of the extra ¥36.5 billion. Existing data not surveyed ¥20.6 billion (highlighted), legal rules left out ¥5.2 billion, existing specs not surveyed ¥4.4 billion, new workflow not checked ¥3.0 billion, security not studied ¥1.9 billion, build and test overlapped ¥1.4 billion
The ¥36.5 billion that the Board of Audit attributed to how SMRJ ran the project, by cause. Each figure combines the increase in the design-and-build contract and the knock-on increases in other contracts (DATA TIMES). (DATA TIMES, based on Chart 6 of the Board of Audit report)

The biggest item, ¥20.6 billion, came from starting to build without surveying the existing data. The causes fall into four groups, and all of them date from before the design-and-build contract was signed.

1. The existing system and data were not properly surveyed (¥25 billion)

After nearly 50 years of patches, nobody could trace from documents alone what the system did and where. According to the Board of Audit, each time the system was changed, SMRJ updated only the manuals and design documents for that part and never brought the whole set up to date. When the rebuild began, neither the business processes nor the system's specifications were fully understood.

The risk had been flagged. In summer 2021, SMRJ asked potential bidders for information. Fujitsu, which built the current system, said that legacy systems like this one often lack proper design documents, that reading the source code alone does not reveal what the business logic means or why it exists, and that the existing specs needed further investigation.

Accenture, which was writing the requirements, took the view that the new system could be designed from the laws and regulations plus the existing source code. PwC, SMRJ's adviser, raised no particular objection. SMRJ finalized the requirements without the extra survey.

Several things surfaced later:

  • A report used for the annual accounts: the function to produce a report on doubtful loans in the bankruptcy-protection scheme was missing from the requirements. By June 2023 a staff member who had handled that report noticed; adding it cost ¥345 million
  • What everyone thought was a backup: some existing data was also kept in a "virtual tape" area, a disk-based store that mimics magnetic tape. SMRJ and Accenture both assumed it held only backups and left it out of the migration. A survey in March 2024 found data that existed only there
  • The incumbent's cooperation: the specifications assumed the company that built the current system would answer the new developer's questions about the data, but nobody had confirmed in advance that it would

To re-check the migration, a new "migration data verification test" was added. That alone cost ¥10.93 billion and was the cause of the first delay.

2. Security information was not gathered widely (¥1.9 billion)

When SMRJ collected information from bidders, it did not ask about security. In June 2022, while reviewing the developer's proposed architecture, it found a risk of intrusion into the network that manages the data, and the network design had to change.

3. Nobody checked whether the new loan scheme was feasible (¥3.0 billion)

Members of the retirement scheme can borrow against what they have paid in. SMRJ wrote its requirements on the assumption that every member would be moved, all at once, to a new loan scheme handled entirely online.

But after the requirements were final, in March 2022, its legal adviser said that members would be worse off, for example by paying transfer fees, so each member's individual consent would be needed. The new system would also have to support the old loan scheme. SMRJ told the developer a year later, in March 2023, and design documents already written had to be redone.

4. Legal and operational rules were left out of the requirements (¥5.2 billion)

This is where the payment-change rule from the top of the story belongs. SMRJ and Accenture planned for the developer to read the laws during basic design, so the requirements did not spell out the legal and operational rules.

For SMRJ's staff, the fact that a payment change takes effect from the month the form is received was common knowledge. So common that they never properly told the developer. And when the design was reviewed, people unfamiliar with the schemes had joined through staff rotation, while there was no checklist or review manual.

The risk of bugs nobody has found yet

The auditors raised one more concern. As the schedule slipped, phases from basic design to acceptance testing ended up running in parallel instead of in sequence, which made the project harder to manage, and design reviews were not robust. So there may be defects in the system under development that have not been detected yet.

What the auditors demanded was that the new system go live only after SMRJ has fully confirmed it meets the quality the schemes need. For future systems, they told SMRJ to build the capacity to work along the government's standard guidelines: survey current operations and data, write the requirements, and communicate them accurately to developers. They also asked the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency to guide SMRJ.

In its statement, SMRJ apologized for worrying members and acknowledged that the added work "should have been carried out from the start." Its president will return 20% of his monthly pay, and its vice president 10%, for two months.

03

What it means for members' payouts

Chapter opener. On the workbench of a small workshop at dusk sit work gloves, an old closed ledger and a small stack of plain gold coins, a few coins being pulled out of frame by a thin thread. Text reads What members will feel

If you are a member, the first question is what happens to your money. The short answer: the basic benefit and the cancellation refund do not change. Payments, loans and changes to contributions all continue on the current system.

The impact falls on the "additional benefit" paid on top of the basic amount.

The rebuild is paid for not with taxes but with investment returns on members' contributions. The 2018 panel discussed funding it from the scheme's own money. Higher costs mean lower profit in that year, and less money for the additional benefit.

SMRJ calculated that, of the ¥4.65 billion spent on rework, the ¥770 million already booked as cost in the retirement scheme reduced the fiscal 2026 pool for the additional benefit from ¥73.0 billion to ¥72.6 billion, a ¥400 million difference. For a model member who paid ¥44,000 a month for 18 years and closed the business, the additional benefit would have been ¥426 higher. That member's basic benefit is about ¥10.87 million, so the difference is small in proportion.

¥40.1 billion not yet booked as cost

But that ¥426 captures only a small part of the impact.

Donut chart, 59% highlighted. On the right: of the amount paid, ¥40.1 billion is to be expensed after launch; ¥67.9 billion paid by March 2026
Of the ¥67.9 billion paid by the end of March 2026, ¥40.1 billion (¥23.5 billion in the retirement scheme, ¥16.6 billion in the bankruptcy-protection scheme) sits on the balance sheet as software under development and has not yet been booked as cost. It will be expensed over five years after the new system goes live (DATA TIMES). (DATA TIMES, based on SMRJ committee papers (October 2026))

In accounting, software under construction is held as an asset, "software in progress," and is expensed over several years once it is finished and in use. SMRJ's papers show that ¥40.1 billion of the ¥67.9 billion paid is in that category and will be depreciated over five years after launch. The same applies to the share of rework costs held as an asset in the retirement scheme: SMRJ says a further ¥1.16 billion will become cost after launch and affect the additional benefit.

We took the calculation one step further.

Only the part held in the retirement scheme's "operations account," which carries the cost of running the scheme, affects the additional benefit. In SMRJ's fiscal 2025 financial statements, the intangible assets in that account, almost all of them the unfinished new system, come to about ¥17 billion. Expensed over five years, that is about ¥3.4 billion a year. Applying the same logic as SMRJ's own estimate (roughly half of any change in cost flows through to the benefit pool), the drag on the pool comes to about ¥1.7 billion a year, a little over 2% of the fiscal 2026 pool of ¥72.6 billion. That only counts what had been capitalized by March 2026; further development and the third delay will push it higher.

This estimate covers the cost of the new system as a whole, not just the rework. Any rebuild costs money. Still, with a project once estimated at ¥15-30 billion now running at ¥96.3 billion in contracts, the overrun is clearly being taken, a little at a time, out of members' additional payouts. The actual benefit swings far more with each year's investment results, so read the figure as an indication of the pressure on the pool.

The retirement scheme holds ¥11.7 trillion in policy reserves, money set aside for future benefits. SMRJ says its accumulated profit of ¥699.4 billion in that scheme can absorb the rebuild and that running the scheme is not at risk. It has said it plans to include an explanation of the cost and the effect on the benefit pool in the annual statement it mails to members.

Who said what, and when

What has been said about the rebuild in government panels and evaluations so far? We went through panel minutes, official evaluations and the Diet record in order.

  • October 2021: In a reply to a working group of the Regulatory Reform Promotion Council, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) wrote that it would put every procedure of both schemes online from September 2025, a promise that depended on the new system
  • March 2024: After SMRJ reported a delay, the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency told it to investigate the causes and prevent a repeat
  • December 2024: At the government's mutual-aid panel, SMRJ's executive in charge reported a delay of about a year and said that, given the schemes' overall finances, the impact on costs would be "limited"
  • December 2025: Three months after the second delay, the same panel met. Its agenda covered the schemes' status and online take-up, and the minutes contain no remarks on the rebuild's delay or cost. That same month the agency again told SMRJ to find the causes and tighten project management
  • As of June 2026: In METI and the Ministry of Finance's evaluation of SMRJ's fiscal 2025 performance, the issues section noted the delay to around February 2027 and that SMRJ was analyzing the causes, and said the matter "may affect next year's evaluation"
  • October 2026: The same month as the audit findings, the panel was shown the details of the extra cost and its effect on the schemes' finances and the additional benefit. SMRJ's own paper said it "had not explained this sufficiently until now"

Searching the Diet record from January 2022 for terms such as "kyosai system" and the agency's name, we found no questions in parliament about the rebuild.

At the October 2026 panel, members asked pointed questions. From the minutes, here are the exchanges that matter for members.

We started from an estimate of ¥15-30 billion at the 12th meeting, and now we are at ¥96 billion, and I expect more to be added. (...) I would like an explanation of why it is still worth doing. ── Akihito Morishita, panel member (General Manager, Group Pension Department, Nippon Life Insurance)

SMRJ's executive replied that members today must visit an agent's counter and fill in paper forms, and phone a call center just to find out how much they would receive, and that this "invisible cost" borne by members is considerable. The old system would soon hit its limits, he said, so the rebuild is necessary even at a higher price.

When explaining to members, this could be a good chance to help them understand that the scheme is designed so that they also have to bear the cost of rebuilding systems like this. ── Kazuhiko Ohashi, panel member (Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration, Hitotsubashi University)

Yumika Sakamoto, a panel member and consultant at the Small and Medium Enterprise IT Management Center, asked SMRJ to make its new committees and roles effective by deciding what they will check and on what criteria they will decide. The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, which runs the panel, said it took the ¥4.6 billion of rework "seriously" and would keep guiding and supervising SMRJ so that quality comes first.

04

Why government IT runs over budget and late

Chapter opener. A shaft of light down a dim government archive corridor lined with old project binders; on a cart in the foreground, a dusty old binder and a new one sit side by side. Text reads Why state IT runs late

What happened here is not unusual for large government systems in Japan. We set this project beside two government-wide surveys by the Board of Audit and three attempts to rebuild long-lived core systems.

Most delays start in the early phases

In 2015 the Board of Audit surveyed design and development across 102 systems at 19 ministries and agencies. Of 98 contracts whose progress by phase could be checked, 52, or 53%, had fallen behind schedule.

Bar chart. 52 of 98 government design-and-build contracts (53%) ran late. Phases where delays occurred: basic design 30, detailed design 34 (highlighted), system test 20, acceptance test 13, go-live 6
Design and development contracts for business applications at 19 ministries and agencies with payments in fiscal 2012-2014, limited to the 98 whose progress by phase could be checked; the number running behind schedule at each phase. One contract can count in several phases (DATA TIMES, based on Table 5 of the Board of Audit's fiscal 2014 audit report). (DATA TIMES, based on the Board of Audit's fiscal 2014 audit report)

Delays were most common in the early phases, up to basic and detailed design. The auditors explained that basic design is when the developer interviews the client about its work, sorts things out and reaches agreement. Delays born there tended to be "made up" in the later phases, where the developer does most of the work, and the auditors warned that this could undermine quality.

Eleven years later, that is exactly what happened with the mutual-aid system. Gaps in the requirements and basic design surfaced late, design and testing were run in parallel to catch up, and the auditors warned of undetected defects.

Three in four tenders drew a single bidder

The second yardstick is competition. A Board of Audit report from May 2021, requested by the upper house's Audit Committee, examined government IT contracts in fiscal 2018.

Bar chart. Share of competitive tenders for government IT systems that drew only one bidder: 2006 report 62.9%, 2011 report 66.4%, fiscal 2018 73.9% (highlighted), all government contracts 30.0% (outline). On the left, a large 73.9%, 313 of 423 competitive tenders
The 2006 and 2011 Board of Audit reports covered different scopes, so they are not directly comparable. The figure for all government contracts is the fiscal 2018 share for all of the national government's competitive contracts, from the Administrative Reform Promotion Council's review (DATA TIMES, based on the Board of Audit's May 2021 report). (DATA TIMES, based on the Board of Audit report on government IT systems (May 2021))

Of 423 competitive tenders, 313, or 73.9%, drew just one bidder. That is more than double the 30% for government contracts as a whole, and the auditors said it pointed to possible "vendor lock-in," where it becomes hard to move away from a particular supplier. The average winning bid was 96.0% of the government's ceiling price when there was one bidder, against 82.5% with two or more. Even among contracts to rebuild an entire existing system, 28 of 39 (71.7%) drew a single bidder.

The mutual-aid rebuild fits the pattern. Minutes from SMRJ's contract monitoring committee in June 2022, a panel of outside experts that reviews its contracts, show that both the design-and-build contract (initially ¥20.68 billion) and the client-support contract (initially ¥7.0 billion) attracted only one bidder or applicant each. A committee member noted that although SMRJ had run a request for information to cast a wide net, "it still ended up with a single bidder or applicant." The ceiling price and winning ratio for the design-and-build contract were not disclosed, on the grounds that they could reveal the ceiling prices of similar contracts.

At the start of any rebuild, the company that knows the old system best is the one that built it. Here too, starting development without first confirming that company's cooperation led to the single biggest cost overrun, in the data migration.

Three attempts to rebuild old core systems

Here are similar rebuilds of national core systems, drawn from official documents.

CaseThe old systemWhat happenedMain causes or lessons stated officially
Japan Patent Office operating platformCore system handling patent and other filings through to registration; design and build contracted in 2006Target launch moved from January 2011 to January 2014, then development was halted in January 2012 on the trade minister's orders. ¥5.45 billion of ¥13.36 billion in initial contracts had been paidRequests from the business side could not be sorted out, and the client did not take ownership of managing the project (Board of Audit)
Pension operations and systems overhaul (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and Japan Pension Service)The pension records system has run since fiscal 1980, with about 86,000 programsThe target for full launch was "January 2026 at the latest" in 2018, "aiming for January 2029" in 2022, and "toward launch in January 2030" in a 2025 paperThe pension records scandal and the creation of the Japan Pension Service forced suspensions and revisions (health ministry)
Mutual-aid system (SMRJ)Built in 1975, last major overhaul in 1995Contracts grew from ¥55.5 billion to ¥96.3 billion; launch delayed three times, from August 2025 to February 2028Design and build began without surveying the existing system and data or writing down the legal requirements (Board of Audit)

Sources: Board of Audit fiscal 2011 audit report; papers for the health ministry's pension operations panel (January 2019, December 2022, February 2025); Board of Audit demand for corrective action, October 2026 (compiled by DATA TIMES). For pensions, the table shows changes in the stated target; we did not find a formal document deciding a delay.

The Patent Office case is the closest match. In its 2012 report the Board of Audit pointed out that the office had treated "the specific way the work was carried out" as "largely at the contractor's discretion and outside the scope of the client's management," and wrote that in system development, the client's own active management is essential. Fourteen years later, the mutual-aid project also leaned on outside firms to fill in its requirements and skipped surveying its own operations and data, and that is where its costs and delays began.

The pension overhaul has chosen a different path. In a 2025 paper, the health ministry said that the client will set the standard methods for design and development and the state will own the copyright to the design documents and programs, with the safe transfer of people's pension records as the top priority. It is a way of not being tied to one supplier's technology.

In the same November 2026 report, the Board of Audit also found that the Supreme Court accepted deliverables for its case-management system "RoootS" as passing inspection even though integration testing had not been completed and the manuals consisted of only a cover and a table of contents. It ruled ¥1.38 billion in payments improper. Abroad, the core marketplace system for the US health insurance site HealthCare.gov saw its contract obligations grow from $56 million to more than $209 million between September 2011 and February 2014, and the US Government Accountability Office blamed changing requirements made worse by oversight gaps.

Three common patterns

Put the government-wide data and the individual cases together, and overruns and delays tend to take three forms.

  1. Current operations and data are not fully written down before building. The older the system, the more its rules live in people's heads and in the code rather than in documents. What is left out shows up as early-phase delays or as "additional work" once building starts
  2. The client's judgment and the knowledge of the old system are left to outsiders. However many firms you hire to manage the project or support the client, only the client who knows the work can make the final call on whether a rule is right. And when only a few firms understand the old system, competition is weak
  3. Phases are overlapped to meet deadlines. Running design and testing in parallel to catch up makes the project harder to manage and lets more slip through

None of these comes down to the ability of any one person at SMRJ or at the contractors. They arise from the nature of the job: rebuilding an old system end to end without stopping daily operations.

What the government and SMRJ have put in place

The government has written rules in response to failures like these. The Digital Agency's standard guidelines for promoting digital government set out how national systems should be built. They call for starting with an "analysis of the current situation," for "phase reviews" at milestones such as before requirements are finalized and before design and build begins, and for a project management office (PMO) in each ministry. SMRJ had committed to following these guidelines from the outset. The audit shows that rules alone cannot prevent failure if the survey work that comes before them is skipped.

In its October paper, SMRJ set out these measures:

  • IT governance rules (September 2026): redefining the roles of a chief digital officer and a chief information security officer, and setting up a project management office for each system
  • Two review boards: one chaired by the president to decide in advance whether large IT investments should start, and one to check requirements documents and specifications on technical grounds
  • A planning unit for operations and systems in the mutual-aid division (planned for April 2027): one place to hold the new system's specifications and business rules, and to keep the design documents current
  • Specialist training: sending staff to outside bodies such as the Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA) and to graduate schools
EDITOR'S TAKE ── How our editor reads it

A rebuild succeeds or fails on writing down today's work

Put the audit, SMRJ's papers, accounts and contract records, and the Board of Audit's government-wide surveys side by side, and the report card splits into three grades: money, time, and whether the lessons are learned.

VIEW01

Money and time: a failing grade. But the third delay put quality first

Contracts are up 1.7 times and launch is two and a half years late. Against the 2018 estimate of ¥15-30 billion, the contracts are now three to six times larger. On money and time, I think the honest grade is a fail.

The third delay itself, though, follows what the auditors asked for: go live only once quality is confirmed. A system that handles 770,000 transactions a year and the contributions and loans of about 2.4 million members cannot afford calculation errors. Launching on time and miscalculating benefits would be far scarier for members. That procedures keep running on the current system is also worth keeping in mind.

VIEW02

However many firms you hire, only the client knows what goes without saying

This project had a firm to write the requirements, a firm to manage progress and a firm to support the client. Even so, a rule that every staff member knew, when a payment change takes effect, slipped through.

Outside firms are good at answering the questions they are asked. But what "goes without saying" only comes from the client's side. When the company that built the current system said source code alone would not reveal the meaning of the business logic, this was exactly its point. I see SMRJ's plan to create, in 2027, one unit that holds both the business rules and the system specs as its most effective fix.

The same goes for competition. The design-and-build and client-support contracts each drew a single bidder, and across government IT, three in four tenders do. If the client can write down its own operations and data, other companies can bid on equal terms. Writing things down is the gateway not only to quality but to competition.

VIEW03

Code can be read; why it does what it does has to be written down by people

More and more, AI will be used to help read old programs. But code shows what a system does, not why it does it or which clause of which law it comes from. Unless people who know the work put that into words, it is lost.

Japan's standardization of local government systems, its Government Cloud and the rebuilding of old systems at ministries and agencies will go on for years. As with our report card on the Government Cloud, where moving a system did not by itself make it cheaper, a rebuild succeeds or fails on whether you can write down today's work before you build. The real report card for the mutual-aid system will come in February 2028, when the new system goes live and we can see whether it holds up.

SOURCES ── References

  1. Board of Audit of Japan, "Rebuilding the mutual-aid system used to streamline the Small Business Mutual Aid and Business Safety Mutual Aid programs", demand for corrective action under Article 34 and opinion under Article 36 of the Board of Audit Act (October 21, 2026) (in Japanese)
  2. Board of Audit of Japan, "Audit Report for Fiscal 2025", overview (November 5, 2026) (in Japanese)
  3. Board of Audit of Japan, "Audit Report for Fiscal 2025", improper items (design, development and modification contracts for the e-case management system) (November 5, 2026) (in Japanese)
  4. SMRJ, "Response to the Board of Audit's demand for corrective action and opinion on how the mutual-aid system rebuild was run" (October 21, 2026) (in Japanese)
  5. SMRJ, "Rebuilding the mutual-aid system", Small and Medium Enterprise Policy Council mutual-aid subcommittee (28th meeting), document 5 (October 5, 2026) (in Japanese)
  6. Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, minutes of the mutual-aid subcommittee (28th meeting) (October 5, 2026) (in Japanese)
  7. Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, minutes of the mutual-aid subcommittee (26th meeting) (December 23, 2025) (in Japanese)
  8. METI and Ministry of Finance, "Evaluation of SMRJ's performance in fiscal 2025" (in Japanese)
  9. METI, "Responses to issues raised (raising online take-up for the Business Safety and Small Business Mutual Aid programs)", Regulatory Reform Promotion Council digital working group, document 4-1 (October 25, 2021) (in Japanese)
  10. Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, minutes of the mutual-aid subcommittee (24th meeting) (December 23, 2024) (in Japanese)
  11. Study group on the Small Business Mutual Aid program, "The future of the Small Business Mutual Aid program" (February 17, 2026) (in Japanese)
  12. Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, "Current state of the Small Business Mutual Aid program", mutual-aid subcommittee (26th meeting), document 2 (December 2025) (in Japanese)
  13. SMRJ, financial statements for fiscal 2025 (Small Business Mutual Aid account) (August 19, 2026) (in Japanese)
  14. SMRJ, "Additional benefit rate for fiscal 2026 under the Small Business Mutual Aid program" (March 31, 2026) (in Japanese)
  15. SMRJ, summary of the contract monitoring committee, first meeting of fiscal 2022 (June 2022) (in Japanese)
  16. SMRJ, disclosure of competitive tender results (head office), March 2022 (in Japanese)
  17. SMRJ, disclosure of negotiated contracts (head office), July 2026 (in Japanese)
  18. SMRJ, disclosure of competitive tender results (head office), August 2026 (in Japanese)
  19. SMRJ, disclosure of competitive tender results (head office), September 2026 (in Japanese)
  20. Board of Audit of Japan, "Audit Report for Fiscal 2014", project management of information systems at ministries and agencies (November 2015) (in Japanese)
  21. Board of Audit of Japan, "Results of the audit of government information systems", report under Article 30-3 of the Board of Audit Act (May 2021) (in Japanese)
  22. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and Japan Pension Service, "Charter for the operations and systems overhaul project, version 1", pension operations panel of the Social Security Council, document 2-2 (January 30, 2019) (in Japanese)
  23. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, "Building a new pension operations system (the overhaul project)", same panel, document 2-1 (December 13, 2022) (in Japanese)
  24. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and Japan Pension Service, "Progress of the operations and systems overhaul", same panel, document 3 (February 6, 2025) (in Japanese)
  25. Board of Audit of Japan, "Audit Report for Fiscal 2011", building the Japan Patent Office operating platform system (in Japanese)
  26. US Government Accountability Office, "Healthcare.gov: Ineffective Planning and Oversight Practices Underscore the Need for Improved Contract Management", GAO-14-694 (July 30, 2014)
  27. Digital Society Promotion Council secretariat, "Standard Guidelines for Promoting Digital Government" DS-100 (decided June 12, 2026; updated July 15, 2026) (in Japanese)
  28. Kumamoto Nichinichi Shimbun (Kyodo News), "SMRJ system costs balloon to ¥96.2 billion, planning flawed" (October 21, 2026) (in Japanese)
  29. DATA TIMES estimate of the effect on the additional-benefit pool, based on SMRJ's financial statements and subcommittee papers (November 14, 2026)
#BUSINESS#Board of Audit of Japan#Government IT#Legacy systems#Requirements definition#Public procurement#Small business